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Abstract: There is much discussion in the United States about exclusionary discipline (suspensions 
and expulsions) in schools. According to a 2014 report from the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights, Black students represent 15% of students, but 44% of students suspended 
more than once and 36% of expelled students. This analysis uses seven years of individual 
infraction-level data from public schools in Arkansas. We find that marginalized students are more 
likely to receive exclusionary discipline, even after controlling for the nature and number of 
disciplinary referrals, but that most of the differences occur across rather than within schools. 
Across the state, black students are about 2.4 times as likely to receive exclusionary discipline 
(conditional on reported infractions and other student characteristics) whereas within school, this 
same conditional disparity is not statistically significant. Within schools, the disproportionalities in 
exclusionary discipline are driven primarily by non-race factors such as free- and reduced-price lunch 
(FRL) eligibility and special education status. We find, not surprisingly, that schools with larger 
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proportions of non-White students tend to give out longer punishments, regardless of school 
income levels, measured by FRL rates. Combined, these results appear to indicate multiple tiers of 
disadvantage: race drives most of the disparities across schools, whereas within schools, FRL or 
special education status may matter more. 
Keywords: discipline policy; school discipline; exclusionary discipline; race; disproportionalities 
Uso desigual del castigo de exclusión: Evidencias sobre las desigualdades en castigo escolar 
de un estado de los EE.UU. 
Resumen: Hay mucha discusión en los Estados Unidos sobre el castigo de exclusión (suspensiones 
y expulsiones) en las escuelas. De acuerdo con un informe de 2014 de la Oficina de Derechos Civiles 
del Departamento de Educación de los Estados Unidos, los estudiantes negros representan el 15% 
de los alumnos, pero el 44% de los estudiantes suspendidos más de una vez y el 36% de los 
estudiantes expulsados. Este análisis utiliza siete años de datos individuales de nivel de infracción de 
escuelas públicas en Arkansas. Hemos comprobado que los estudiantes marginados tienen más 
probabilidades de recibir un castigo de exclusión, incluso después de controlar la forma de ser y el 
número de referencias disciplinarias, pero que la mayoría de las diferencias se producen a través de 
las escuelas. En todo el estado, los alumnos negros tienen cerca de 2,4 veces más posibilidades de ser 
propensos a recibir castigo de exclusión (condicional en infracciones relatadas y otras características 
del alumno), mientras que dentro de la escuela, esta misma disparidad condicional no es 
significativamente significativa . En las escuelas, las desproporcionalidades en el castigo de exclusión 
son impulsadas principalmente por factores no raciales, tales como elegibilidad para almuerzo gratis 
y precio reducido (FRL) y status de educación especial. Hemos descubierto, no sorprendentemente, 
que las escuelas con mayor proporción de estudiantes no blancos tienden a dar castigos más largos, 
independientemente de los niveles de ingreso escolar, medidos por las tasas FRL. Combinados, estos 
resultados parecen indicar múltiples capas de desventajas: la raza impulsa la mayoría de las 
disparidades en las escuelas, mientras que en las escuelas, el FRL o el estado de educación especial 
pueden importar más. 
Palabras-clave: política de castigo; castigo escolar; exclusion; raza 
Utilização desigual da punição de exclusão: Evidências sobre as desigualdades em 
punição escolar de um estado dos EUA 
Resumo: Há muita discussão nos Estados Unidos sobre a punição de exclusão (suspensões e 
expulsões) nas escolas. De acordo com um relatório de 2014 do Escritório de Direitos Civis do 
Departamento de Educação dos Estados Unidos, os estudantes negros representam 15% dos 
alunos, mas 44% dos estudantes suspensos mais de uma vez e 36% dos estudantes expulsos. Esta 
análise usa sete anos de dados individuais de nível de infração de escolas públicas no Arkansas. 
Verificamos que os estudantes marginalizados têm maior probabilidade de receber punição de 
exclusão, mesmo depois de controlar a maneira de ser e o número de referências disciplinares, mas 
que a maioria das diferenças ocorre através de do que dentro das escolas. Em todo o estado, alunos 
negros têm cerca de 2,4 vezes mais chances de ser propensos a receber punição de exclusão 
(condicional em infrações relatadas e outras características do aluno), enquanto que dentro da escola, 
esta mesma disparidade condicional não é significativamente significativa. Nas escolas, as 
desproporcionalidades na punição de exclusão são impulsionadas principalmente por fatores não-
raciais, tais como elegibilidade para almoço grátis e preço reduzido (FRL) e status de educação 
especial. Descobrimos, não surpreendentemente, que as escolas com maior proporção de estudantes 
não-brancos tendem a dar punições mais longas, independentemente dos níveis de renda escolar, 
medidos pelas taxas FRL. Combinados, esses resultados parecem indicar múltiplas camadas de 
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desvantagens: a raça impulsiona a maioria das disparidades nas escolas, enquanto nas escolas, o 
FRL ou o status de educação especial podem importar mais. 
Palavras-chave: política de punição; punição escolar; exclusão; raça 
Background on Issues in School Discipline 
Since the early 1990s, many schools across the United States have adopted zero-tolerance 
and other harsh disciplinary policies in response to fears of violence in schools. The zero-tolerance 
philosophy is an approach that removes students from school for a variety of violations, ranging 
from actual serious offenses like violent behavior to dress code violations or truancy (Losen & 
Skiba, 2010; Skiba, 2014; Skiba & Peterson, 1999). While it is necessary for school leaders to do what 
is reasonable to maintain a positive learning environment and ensure the safety of the school 
community, these so-called zero-tolerance policies have been opposed by a growing number of 
researchers and observers who fear that this movement has gone too far.  
Opponents of harsh disciplinary practices have voiced numerous concerns. First, there is 
some evidence that these policies do not have the hoped-for deterrent effect. For example, Curran 
(2016) recently found that state zero-tolerance laws are not associated with decreases in problem 
behaviors as perceived by principals. In fact, there is evidence that school suspension predicts higher 
rates of misbehavior and suspensions in the future, rather than reducing misbehaviors (Costenbader 
& Markson, 1998; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Tobin, Sugai, & Colvin, 1996). Moreover, critics fear that 
zero tolerance might have other unintended negative consequences (Skiba, 2014). Zero-tolerance 
policies and exclusionary discipline practices, such as expulsions and suspensions, have been 
associated with lower academic achievement (Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; 
Raffaele-Mendez, Knoff, & Ferron, 2002; Skiba & Rausch, 2004), school dropout (American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological Association, 2008; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, 
& Rock, 1986), and involvement in the juvenile justice system (American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2013; Balfanz, Spiridakis, Neild, & Letgers, 2003; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, 
& Valentine, 2009).  
This active opposition to exclusionary discipline has made an impact and influenced some 
high-profile changes in school disciplinary practices. Chicago public schools enacted a policy in 2012 
to reduce the length of student suspensions, and researchers from the Consortium on Chicago 
School Research have been analyzing the impacts (Sartain et al., 2015). In September 2014, 
California became the first state in the nation to enact limits of student suspension for minor 
misbehaviors (Public Counsel, 2014). One of the nation’s largest school districts, Miami-Dade, also 
eliminated out-of-school suspensions (OSS) ahead of the 2015-16 school year (O’Connor, 2015). In 
Seattle, the School Board declared a one-year moratorium on suspensions for elementary students in 
September 2015 (Cornwell, 2015).  
Perhaps a key reason that disciplinary policies have been revised is the concern that zero-
tolerance policies and exclusionary practices have been applied disproportionately to students from 
marginalized backgrounds. A 2014 national report from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights focused on the racial disparity in exclusionary disciplinary policies. The authors 
reported that although Black students represent only 15% of students across the nation, 35% of 
students suspended once are Black, 44% of students suspended more than once are Black, and 36% 
of expelled students are Black. Indeed, over the past decade (and beyond), numerous researchers 
have documented differences in suspension rates between White students and non-White students 
across the nation (Children’s Defense Fund, 1975; Costenbader & Markson, 1998; Losen & 
Gillespie, 2012; Losen, Hodson, Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Raffaele-
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Mendez, 2003; Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; 
Sullivan, Klingbeil, & Van Norman, 2013). In addition, non-White students were more likely to 
receive suspensions for relatively subjective offenses, such as disrespect; the result is that non-
Whites were disproportionately missing school time, often for non-violent or even trivial reasons 
(Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002).  
In reaction to these circumstances, there is a growing, but still sparse, research base 
examining the racial disparities in the incidence of exclusionary discipline in schools across the 
country. Some studies rely on aggregate school- or district-level data and thus do not connect the 
actual student infractions to the disciplinary consequences (Children’s Defense Fund, 1975; Losen, 
2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010); such studies are informative but do not shed light on whether students 
are being treated unfairly. Others have utilized student-level data, but focus on disproportionalities 
in outcomes, without connecting them to the type or severity of infraction recorded (Raffaele-
Mendez, 2003; Sullivan et al., 2013). Some more recent studies do utilize student-level or infraction-
level datasets to address a more important issue: whether particular groups of students treated 
differently for committing the same type of infraction (Skiba et al., 2014; Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et 
al., 2002). While several of these analyses move the knowledge base forward on the question, these 
studies are hampered by a variety of issues such as limited samples of students - one study (Skiba et 
al., 2002) involved only middle schools in a single district. In addition, certain studies do not 
incorporate school-level information or school fixed effects to assess whether disparities exist within 
certain types of schools (Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba et al., 2002). 
Thus, in this article, we examine all disciplinary infractions and the resulting consequences 
for all K-12 students in a single U.S. state over a seven-year time period. We are able to connect 
individual student characteristics to specific infractions and to the resulting consequences. Using this 
rich dataset, we can carefully examine disparities in disciplinary outcomes by race and other student 
characteristics, while controlling for the infraction committed and for school attended. By 
identifying the extent to which students of different racial groups are punished more or less severely 
for the same offenses, even within the same schools, we hope to make a meaningful contribution to 
the growing evidence base on this important and timely issue.  
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present the literature on the 
topic of disparities in school discipline, and articulate our research questions. In Section III, we 
describe our data and sample. Section IV outlines our analytic methods, Section V presents the 
results, and in Section VI, we conclude with some discussion of our results. 
Evidence from the Literature 
We describe the relevant research in two sections. First, we present the evidence on the 
racial disparities in student discipline on a national level. Studies addressing this broad question 
generally rely on school-level data and provide only an overview of the consequences levied on 
students of different races. While these analyses are certainly important, they leave many questions 
unanswered because they do not examine the drivers of these differences. For example, if particular 
groups of students are punished more severely than others for serious but similar infractions, this is 
likely an indication of implicit or explicit bias in disciplinary practice at the school. Thus, the second 
set of studies we present are particularly informative as they investigate the student- and school-level 
characteristics that are associated with the racial disparities in discipline. 
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National Overviews of Disciplinary Disproportionalities 
In 2015, Dan Losen and colleagues from the Civil Rights Project at UCLA, published a 
comprehensive report asking “Are We Closing the School Discipline Gap?” The authors focused on 
out-of-school suspension rates in every school district in the nation through the 2011-12 school 
year. The data revealed the overall increase in suspensions over the past 40 years, as well as the 
increasing gap in the suspension rates for White students and students of color. In 1972-73, only 6% 
of Black students were suspended during the year, as compared to 3% of White students (and 3% of 
Hispanic students). By 2011-12, 16% of Black students were suspended; this rate was more than 
twice as great as for Hispanic students (7%) and more than three times as great as for White 
students (5%). Moreover, the authors also examined rates within states and districts and found much 
variability, indicating that district and school policies could strongly influence exclusionary discipline 
outcomes. 
Several years earlier, Losen teamed with noted discipline researcher Russell Skiba on a 
national study of suspension rates in middle school, using an earlier 2006 version of the Civil Rights 
Data Collection (CRDC). In this study, the authors analyzed suspension rates for students in more 
than 9,200 middle schools across the nation, as well as a sub-sample from 18 large urban districts, 
from the years 2002 to 2006 (Losen & Skiba, 2010). This analysis also revealed stark racial gaps in 
suspensions; for example, while only 10% of White male students in middle school were suspended 
in 2006, 28% of Black male students were suspended in that same year. In the urban sub-sample 
district-level analysis, the authors found many schools in which more than one out of every three 
students in a particular racial group had been suspended during the year. 
Overall, these and other analyses confirm that there are indeed systematic racial disparities in 
out-of-school suspensions. But, what factors drive these disparities? And do these differences persist 
even after controlling for infractions and referrals? In the next section, we summarize the emerging 
research literature addressing these questions. While we have not conducted a full systematic review 
of the literature, we searched thoroughly for literature on racial disparities in school discipline, with a 
focus on the use of exclusionary discipline, and used a snowball search to identify additional studies 
to include. We do not include theoretical or philosophical arguments for or against exclusionary 
discipline, but rather focus on studies that quantitatively assess the number of infractions or 
incidences of disciplinary consequences and the demographic characteristics of the students 
receiving these consequences. In general, we focus on articles since the year 2000. 
Studies Examining the Drivers of Racial Discipline Gaps 
In Chicago, where there has been a great deal of focus on exclusionary discipline in recent 
years, researchers from the Consortium on Chicago School Research scanned discipline data from 
roughly 85,000 high school students in the district in 2013-14 (Sartain et al., 2015). Using descriptive 
analyses, the authors have shown that Black students were three times as likely as Hispanic students 
to be suspended, and four times as likely as White and Asian students. While there was some 
evidence of students of different racial backgrounds systematically receiving more suspensions 
within the same schools, the primary driver of the differences was the school. That is, Black students 
attended schools, on average, that reported larger numbers of suspensions. While this investigation 
did consider some factors that play a role in the disparities, the authors were unable to account for 
the infractions allegedly committed by the students. Moreover, suspensions were the only 
consequence analyzed here. Nevertheless, this study moved the field forward by putting forth the 
idea that differing school environments or practices may be one driver of the racial discipline gap. 
Welch and Payne (2010) further examined what drives the discipline gap by considering the 
“racial threat hypothesis” from criminal justice research. The authors posited that school leaders in 
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buildings serving more Black students would be more likely to use punitive discipline and less likely 
to use restorative approaches. Analyzing data from a 1998 nationally representative survey of 
students and school personnel in 294 public middle schools and high schools, the authors used 
multivariate regression techniques and found that principals in schools with higher proportions of 
Black students were more likely to report the use of punitive disciplinary styles. Next, the authors 
considered the influence of differential behavior by different groups of students by controlling for 
student reports of delinquency and teacher reports of school safety. This study suggests that 
students in schools serving high concentrations of Black students may well be subject to stricter 
discipline measures despite similarly safe and orderly environments. The weakness here, of course, is 
that the study is based on self-reports of disciplinary strategies rather than on actual disciplinary 
outcomes; moreover, the data are all school-level and do not indicate whether Black students 
themselves are punished more severely or more frequently. 
The studies discussed up to this point do not provide much information related to the 
causes of the observed disproportionalities. The disproportionalities may be due to more frequent 
misbehavior by Black students or a greater willingness of school staff to refer these students to the 
office for subjective offenses. While many of the studies described in the previous section utilized 
student-level data, other researchers have advanced the field by using infraction- and referral-level 
data to further analyze the disciplinary outcomes for certain infraction types. 
Russell Skiba and a variety of colleagues have published studies that assess the drivers of 
actual racial disparities in discipline. First of all, Skiba et al. (2002) used student-level data on more 
than 11,000 students from 19 middle schools in one of the largest U.S. school districts in 1994-95 to 
explore what factors drive discipline disproportionalities. While this analysis did not consider the 
variation in disciplinary strictness between schools, the authors did pay attention to infraction type 
and assessed whether differential bad behavior might play a role by analyzing the reasons for the 
disciplinary referrals. Specifically, the authors found that White students were more likely to be 
referred to the office for objective infractions such as smoking or vandalism while Black students 
were more likely to be referred for more subjective offenses such as disrespect and noise. Thus, the 
authors concluded that Black students were not more “disruptive,” but they have also shown that 
the disproportionalities were indeed due to greater numbers of office referrals rather than greater 
severity of punishment (race had no impact on the length of punishment, given the referral). 
Skiba et al. (2011) investigated the issue more deeply using student-infraction-level data from 
364 elementary and middle schools across the United States using School-wide Positive Behavior 
Supports in 2005-06. Using logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression, the authors found 
that (1) Black students are more likely than White students to be referred to the office for a large 
variety of disciplinary infractions, and that (2) for the same referred infractions, Black students in all 
grades were significantly more likely to be given out-of-school suspension or even expulsion. Thus, 
even after accounting for the reported infraction type, Black students were more likely to be given 
exclusionary discipline. The only gap in this analysis is that there is no control for school effects; so, 
we do not know if the disparate strictness is occurring within school or between schools. 
Next, Skiba et al. (2014) used Hierarchical Linear Modeling to predict punishment as a 
function of infraction type and incorporated a third level to the model by incorporating school 
characteristics. Using information from all students in the disciplinary database in a single 
Midwestern state in 2007-08, the authors found that the odds of being suspended or expelled were 
predictably influenced by the severity of the infraction. Importantly, even after controlling for the 
infraction, Black students remained more likely to be given out-of-school suspensions, but were no 
more likely to be expelled. This analysis extends beyond the prior work due to the inclusion of level 
three, in which school-level characteristics, such as student race and poverty and the principal’s 
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attitude toward discipline, are incorporated into the model. In this third level analysis, the race of the 
individual student was no longer significant; school-level variables, including the concentration of 
Black students in the school, drove the severity of the punishments allocated. Thus, these results are 
consistent with the “racial threat hypothesis” in schools suggested by Welch and Payne (2010). One 
potential weakness of the Skiba et al. (2014) study is the setting and context – the data represent a 
single year in a single U.S. state that serves relatively few FRL-eligible students (fewer than 40%) and 
very few Black students (8%). Our current study expands on this work by incorporating seven years 
of student-level panel data in a state that contains a more diverse population (about 21% Black and 
about 10% Hispanic). 
Overall, a vast amount of evidence indicates there are racial disparities with respect to 
exclusionary discipline outcomes. Indeed, the Office for Civil Rights has recently demonstrated 
nationwide racial disparities in rates of suspensions and expulsions, and moreover, a couple of recent 
studies have concluded that Black students have been given disproportionate consequences for the 
infraction committed. However, it is still not clear whether in most cases, this disparity is due to 
students being treated differently in the same school or to the fact that Black students attend 
systematically different schools where the disciplinary practices are abnormally strict. To date, the 
most thorough analysis conducted to assess the extent to which non-White students have been more 
severely punished for similar disciplinary referrals, considering also whether these disparities occur 
within schools and across schools, has been published by Skiba et al. (2014). 
Thus, although questions surrounding the sources of disciplinary disparities are critically 
important, the best evidence to date comes from a single school year in a single state serving 
relatively few FRL-eligible and Black students. Therefore, we believe it is valuable to conduct such 
analyses in additional settings, ideally with greater levels of student diversity and a longer study 
period. Our current study expands on previous work by accounting for specific infraction 
information (type, frequency, etc.) and school-level fixed effects whenever possible, using multiple 
years of data within a single U.S. state serving a student population that is approximately 60% low-
income (FRL-eligible) and 20% Black. 
Research Questions Guiding this Study 
First, across the state, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of exclusionary 
discipline for non-White, low-income students, special education students, or English language 
learners? 
Second, within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of exclusionary 
discipline for non-White students? 
Finally, what are the school characteristics that are associated with harsher (longer) 
disciplinary consequences? 
Data and SampleArkansas Student Sample 
First, it is important to note how closely the patterns in the Arkansas data utilized in this 
study mirror the OCR data mentioned previously. In Table 1, we calculate the percentage of 
students in various subgroups, the percentage of students who received OSS at least once who were 
in these subgroups, and the percentage of students who were expelled in these subgroups.1 The odds 
of a student in a given subgroup being in a consequence category (e.g. expelled) is the percentage of 
1We report differences between Black and White students, Hispanic and White students, ELL and non-ELL 
students, special education and regular education students. The Office for Civil Rights does not report 
disciplinary rates for FRL and non-FRL students separately, and the Arkansas dataset we used did not include 
gender, so those differences are not reported here. 
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expelled students in that group divided by the percentage of total students in that group. For 
example, White students represent 65% of students in the state of Arkansas, and 38% of students 
receiving OSS, so the odds ratio is equal to (0.38/0.65) or approximately 0.58. Odds of less than one 
indicate that a certain group is underrepresented in a certain category, relative to their prevalence in 
the state, and odds of greater than one indicate that a certain group is overrepresented in a certain 
category. 
Then, we calculate disparities (relative odds) between groups, which can be compared across 
different subgroups. In terms of the disparities for Black students, relative to White students, the 
Arkansas disparities are larger than the nationwide disparities for OSS, but smaller for expulsions. 
We can also see that overall, the Black-White disparities are much larger than any other disparities, 
including those for special education students relative to non-special education students. 
Interestingly, in both the OCR data (nationally) and in the Arkansas data, based on the odds, 
Hispanic students and English language learners are somewhat underrepresented in these types of 
exclusionary discipline practices. However, when we compare the relative odds of Hispanic students 
to White students, there are still disparities, at least in the OCR data. Arkansas Hispanic students are 
under-represented, even relative to White students, at least in terms of expulsions. While Arkansas is 
only one of 50 states in the United States, the similarities in these patterns (particularly with regard 
to the Black-White disparity) indicate that many of the findings of the current study may be relevant 
for many other parts of the nation as well. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The study uses seven years of de-identified demographic and disciplinary data from all K-12 
schools in Arkansas provided by the Arkansas Department of Education (2008-09 through 2014-
15). The student demographic data include race, grade, special education status, limited English 
proficiency status, and free-and-reduced-lunch (FRL) eligibility. Discipline data include indicators 
for 19 infraction types and 13 consequences, the date of the infraction, and the length of the 
consequence. To simplify the analysis, we have collapsed infractions involving handguns, rifles, and 
shotguns into a single category, resulting in only 17 distinct categories. Furthermore, 13 consequence 
categories are collapsed into 7 (in school suspension (ISS), OSS, expulsion, referral to an alternative 
learning environment (ALE), corporal punishment, no action, and other).2 An alternative learning 
environment is an “an alternate class or program within a public school or school district that 
affords all students an environment that seeks to eliminate barriers to learning for any student whose 
academic and social progress is negatively affected by the student's personal characteristics or 
situation” (AR Code § 6-48-104, 2015). 
2Our measure of out-of-school suspension includes two separately reported OSS types (Out-of-School 
Suspension (when the incident did not result in physical injury) and Out-of-School Suspension (when the 
incident did result in physical injury). Our measure of expulsion includes five separately reported expulsion 
types (Expelled, Expelled for Weapons (as defined by Federal, State, and Student Discipline Policy), Expelled 
for Drugs (does not include alcohol or tobacco), Expelled for dangerousness (the incident did not result in 
physical injury), and Expelled for dangerousness (the incident resulted in physical injury). Our measure of 
ALE referrals includes two separately reported consequence types (Alternative Learning Environment (full 
year) and Alternative Learning Environment (less than one year)). The other three consequence categories are 
Corporal Punishment, No Action, and Other. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Arkansas Disciplinary Data and Office for Civil Rights National Data 
White Black 
% of Group Odds % of Group Odds Disparity 
Arkansas   
(2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
% Enrollment 65% 21% 
% Receiving OSS 38% 0.58 54% 2.53 4.32 
% Expelled 48% 0.75 44% 2.06 2.75 
OCR      
(2011-12)* 
% Enrollment 52% 16% 
% Receiving OSS 35% 0.67 38% 2.38 3.56 
% Expelled 36% 0.70 36% 2.25 3.20 
White Hispanic 
% of Group Odds % of Group Odds Disparity 
Arkansas          
(2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
% Enrollment 65% 10% 
% Receiving OSS 38% 0.58 6% 0.61 1.05 
% Expelled 48% 0.75 6% 0.57 0.76 
OCR      
(2011-12)* 
% Enrollment 52% 24% 
% Receiving OSS 35% 0.67 22% 0.91 1.37 
% Expelled 36% 0.70 22% 0.90 1.28 
Non-English 
Language Learner 
(Non-ELL) 
English Language Learner 
(ELL) 
% of Group Odds % of Group Odds Disparity 
Arkansas          
(2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
% Enrollment 93% 7% 
% Receiving OSS 96% 1.03 4% 0.57 0.55 
% Expelled 96% 1.03 4% 0.55 0.53 
OCR      
(2011-12)* 
% Enrollment 90% 10% 
% Receiving OSS 94% 1.04 6% 0.60 0.57 
% Expelled 95% 1.06 5% 0.50 0.47 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
Comparison of Arkansas Disciplinary Data and Office for Civil Rights National Data 
Regular Education Special Education 
% of 
Group Odds 
% of 
Group Odds Disparity 
Arkansas          
(2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
% Enrollment 89% 11% 
% Receiving OSS 81% 0.91 19% 1.69 1.85 
% Expelled 81% 0.91 19% 1.76 1.94 
OCR      
(2011-12)* 
% Enrollment 88% 12% 
% Receiving OSS 78% 0.89 22% 1.83 2.07 
% Expelled 81% 0.92 19% 1.58 1.72 
Non-FRL-Eligible FRL Eligible 
% of 
Group Odds 
% of 
Group Odds Disparity 
Arkansas          
(2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
% Enrollment 40% 60% 
% Receiving OSS 21% 0.52 79% 1.32 2.52 
% Expelled 21% 0.53 79% 1.31 2.48 
OCR      
(2011-12)* 
% Enrollment N/A N/A 
% Receiving OSS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
% Expelled N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Note: All percentages reflect the number of students receiving either OSS or expulsion at least once in a school year that 
are within a certain subgroup. Odds for white students are the percent of students suspended or expelled divided by the 
percent of enrollment. Values over one indicate over-representation. Disparities (relative odds) are calculated as the odds 
for one group divided by the odds for another group. These indicate whether a subgroup is over-represented relative to 
another subgroup. Values greater than one indicate over-representation. Values less than one indicate under-
representation. Office for Civil Rights race breakdowns reflect the race/ethnic composition of students without 
disabilities and students with disabilities served under IDEA. Special-education students only include those with an IEP, 
under the IDEA. Does not include handicapped students under Section 504. The Office for Civil Rights does not report 
disciplinary rates for FRL and non-FRL students separately. 
Table 2 
Infraction Types, By Year from 2008-09 to 2014-15 (Arkansas) 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total % of 
Total 
Disorderly Conduct     54,641    51,027    48,765    51,539    42,575    57,750    63,533      369,830 29.7% 
Other     31,871    28,639    26,481   31,858    35,024    60,600    95,733      310,206 24.9% 
Insubordination     47,273    46,151    45,765    38,798    34,759    43,068    51,200      307,014 24.7% 
Fighting     12,378    12,456    12,471    12,136    12,434    13,128   14,576        89,579 7.2% 
Truancy      9,968    11,834    11,734    10,465      9,407    12,914    14,987        81,309 6.5% 
Bullying      3,455      4,099      4,363      4,483      4,515      5,496      5,856        32,267 2.6% 
Tobacco      2,218      2,253      1,973      1,920      1,977      2,482      2,837        15,660 1.3% 
Student Assault      1,856      1,820      1,615      1,645      2,007      2,153      2,232        13,328 1.1% 
Drugs         944   996         954      1,146      1,259      1,295      1,511          8,105 0.7% 
Vandalism         962         833         909         689         736      1,084      1,087          6,300 0.5% 
Knife         401         419         384         396         443         532         497          3,072 0.2% 
Staff Assault         292         312         277         314         354         350         487          2,386 0.2% 
Alcohol         294         299         325         289         309         353         416          2,285 0.2% 
Gangs         361         339         177         107         131         103         113          1,331 0.1% 
Explosives           49           57           60           50       42           53           40 351 0.0% 
Club           21           21           49           45           42           53           57 288 0.0% 
Guns           38           18           32           26   35           33           62 244 0.0% 
Total   167,022   161,573   156,334   155,906   146,049   201,447   255,224   1,243,555 100.0% 
% of Total 13.4% 13.0% 12.6% 12.5% 11.7% 16.2% 20.5% 100.0% 
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The unit of analysis is the student-infraction level, so students can and often do have 
multiple observations within the same year. After removing duplicate entries (same student, 
discipline date, infraction type, consequence type, etc.), 1,243,555 total observations remain over the 
seven-year period. These observations were recorded for 240,999 individual students, which would 
represent about 35% of the individual students expected to attend Arkansas schools during this time 
period (thus, the other 65% of students in the state’s public schools received no disciplinary referrals 
or consequences during this time period.) The breakdown by infraction and consequence, by year, 
can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The vast majority of infractions (79.4%) are relatively subjective 
consequences such as disorderly conduct (29.7%), other infractions not specified in these categories 
(24.9%), and insubordination (24.7%).  
Table 3 shows the trends in the reported types of disciplinary consequences. We include out-
of-school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to an Alternative Learning Environment as 
exclusionary, given that they remove a student from the traditional learning environment, and in the 
case of expulsions and ALE, for long periods of time. In-school suspensions are considered non-
exclusionary as the student remains in the school building, continues to receive assignments from 
their regularly assigned teacher, and then returns to the same classroom after a relatively short 
suspension (generally one to two days). The trend over time has been a decrease in exclusionary 
discipline as a proportion of total infractions (about 25% all disciplinary consequences were 
exclusionary in 2008-09 compared to only about 19% in 2014-15), but much of this is due to large 
increases in the use of other non-specified consequences. While we have concerns about the 
uncertainty within this other non-specified category, the vast majority of these other non-specified 
outcomes are non-exclusionary.3 Expulsions and no actions are consistently rare, and ISS was the 
largest category in each year, until 2014-15, in which the other (non-specified) category was the most 
common. The number of incidences of the other (non-specified) consequence category grew by 
over 300% between 2008-09 and 2014-15. 
To simplify interpretation of the infraction categories, we create categories based on the type 
and length of consequences typically received for each infraction type. We present the percentage of 
incidences that result in exclusionary discipline (expulsion, out-of-school suspension, or referral to 
an Alternative Learning Environment), as well as the number of days of suspension or expulsion 
that typically result. Table 4 indicates the descriptive statistics used in the creation of these 
categories. To group these infractions, we consider, simultaneously, the percentage of incidences of 
that infraction type that result in exclusionary discipline, as well as the typical number of days of 
exclusionary discipline that results. At the same time, we consider infractions that are similar in 
nature (for example, substances that are not only illegal to have at school, but also illegal for even 18 
year olds, such as drugs and alcohol, are somewhat different than tobacco and thus grouped as 
such). Further, the cut-off between “major” and “minor” non-violent offenses, for example, is 
primarily based on the likelihood of each offense resulting in exclusionary discipline; there is a break 
in the pattern where the three “major” non-violent offenses result in the student being excluded 
approximately 30% of the time while “minor” offenses lead to exclusionary discipline around 20% 
of the time.  
3 Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for Research and 
Technology, Eric Saunders, indicates that the majority of these other consequences are detentions, bus 
suspensions, parent/guardian conferences, Saturday school, or warnings. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 25 No. 49       12
Table 3 
Consequence Types, By Year from 2008-09 to 2014-15 (Arkansas) 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total % of 
Total 
Exlusionary Discipline 
Out-of-School Suspension   41,348   39,613   36,780   37,791   40,233   42,290   47,853    285,908 23.0% 
ALE        918        794        621        253        317        586        538        4,027 0.3% 
Expulsion     135        322        193          95        200        249        165        1,359 0.1% 
Total Exclusionary  42,401   40,729   37,594   38,139   40,750   43,125   48,556    291,294 23.4% 
% of Annual Total 25.4% 25.2% 24.0% 24.5% 27.9% 21.4% 19.0% 23.4% 23.4%   
Non-Exclusionary Discipline 
In-School Suspension   63,018   64,760   60,052   62,532   63,019   74,169   92,084    479,634 38.6% 
Other   23,120   23,858   27,600   26,482   21,850   62,972   92,865    278,747 22.4% 
Corporal Punishment   36,484   30,732   29,311   27,760   19,142   19,746   19,571    182,746 14.7% 
No Action     1,999     1,494     1,777        993     1,288     1,435     2,148      11,134 0.9% 
Total Non-Exclusionary 124,621 120,844 118,740 117,767 105,299 158,322 206,668    952,261 76.6% 
% of Annual Total 74.6% 74.8% 76.0% 75.5% 72.1% 78.6% 81.0% 76.6% 76.6% 
Total 167,022 161,573 156,334 155,906 146,049 201,447 255,224 1,243,555 100.0% 
% of 7 Year Total 13.4% 13.0% 12.6% 12.5% 11.7% 16.2% 20.5% 100.0% 
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 Interestingly, in Table 4, we see that exclusionary discipline is not even used in all gun 
infractions. While expulsion is allowed for any student who brings a firearm or other weapon to 
school, the superintendent also has discretion to modify this requirement on a case-by-case basis, 
which appears to be happening in over 20% of gun cases (AR Code § 6-18-507, 2015). The ability 
for school district leaders to adjust consequences on a case-by-case basis is perhaps further evidence 
that there are opportunities for disproportionalities in discipline outcomes to occur, even for 
infraction types in which we expect near universal exclusion. 
The state only codes certain types of infractions and consequences, so some categories used 
at a local level are coded as “other” at the state level. As a result, a large number of cases can be 
coded as “other” in either the infraction committed, the consequence received, or both. In the next 
section, we describe the analytic methods we employ to analyze these data and examine any possible 
disparities in disciplinary practices.  
Table 4 
Category Groups (Based on Percent Exclusionary and Number of Days of Exclusion) 
% Resulting in 
Exclusionary 
Discipline 
Typical Number 
of Days of 
Exclusion 
Guns 77.5 11.8 
Drugs and Alcohol 87.8 8.8 
Drugs 88.2 9.0 
Alcohol 86.4 8.0 
Major Violence/Weapons 75.1 5.2 
Club 83.0 4.0 
Knife 74.9 5.8 
Staff Assault 74.4 4.7 
Minor Violence/Weapons 59.3 3.6 
Gangs 63.6 5.4 
Fighting 60.8 3.5 
Student Assault 49.2 3.9 
Explosives 47.6 4.5 
Major Non-Violent 30.3 3.1 
Tobacco 35.4 3.3 
Vandalism 32.1 4.1 
Bullying 27.5 2.8 
Minor Non-Violent 19.2 3.2 
Disorderly 
Conduct 
20.4 3.6 
Insubordination 18.7 2.7 
Other 18.2 3.2 
Truancy 12.0 2.9 
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Analytic Method 
In our straightforward descriptive analyses presented in the previous section, we have 
described how frequently students of various subgroups are cited for various types of infractions as 
well as how frequently students in these subgroups receive various types of consequences. Next, we 
use logistic regression and aggregated residual techniques to address our three primary research 
questions. 
Research Question 1: Across the state, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use 
of exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special 
education students, or English language learners? 
We begin by testing whether students of various subgroups are more or less likely to receive 
exclusionary discipline, controlling for the type of infraction committed. We first analyze these 
disparities at a state level. Any disparities we find at this level could be due to differences across 
districts or schools, within district, or within school. We utilize logistic regression to predict whether 
certain types of students are more likely to receive exclusionary discipline (expulsion, OSS, or 
referral to an ALE), rather than another consequence (ISS, corporal punishment, no action, or 
other). Whether or not a student receives exclusionary discipline (𝐸1) is defined as: 
 𝐸1 = { 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐸1
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐸1
∗ ≤ 0
𝐸1
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
Where 𝑉𝑖 is a vector of the student-level demographic indicators (some combination of race, FRL-
eligibility, special education status and LEP-status), 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a vector of 7 infraction categories, 
grouped by severity, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a vector of indicators for whether the infraction was the first, 
second, third, etc., for that student that year (a total of 10 indicators for 1-9 and 10 or more), 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 
is a vector of school-year indicators, and 𝜀𝑖 is the infraction-level idiosyncratic error (clustered at the 
student level). 
In this first analysis, no school-level indicators or covariates are included, so it is considered 
a model of state-wide racial or other disparities in disciplinary outcomes, conditional on similar 
infraction types, infraction history, and grade level. 
Research Question 2: Within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of 
exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special education 
students, or English language learners? 
Next, we seek to understand the disparities within schools, rather than across schools. We 
utilize similar logistic regression as in Research Question 1, but with the addition of school fixed 
effects. This within-school analytic strategy is motivated by work by Anderson & Ritter 
(forthcoming) who find that most of the disparities in the length of punishments (e.g. number of 
days of suspensions) at the state level diminishes when school fixed effects are included, indicating 
that most of the disparities are across schools rather than within schools. If, in the current study, the 
disparities diminish when school fixed effects are included in our models, this would indicate that a 
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great deal of the variation exists between schools. Thus, we also ask question three which seeks to 
disentangle the particular school characteristics driving these differences. 
Research Question 3: What are the school characteristics that are associated with 
harsher (longer) disciplinary consequences? 
To address whether certain types of schools are more likely to assign disproportionately long 
punishments for similar types of infractions, we use a two-stage residuals analysis approach. In the 
first stage, we predict the number of days of exclusionary discipline as a function of information 
related to the reported infraction that could reasonably predict the type or length of consequence 
received, as well as the cumulative number of reported infractions associated with that student 
during the same school year. In this first stage, we do not include any student demographic 
information other than grade level, which could be associated with the type or severity of 
consequence used. Our first stage model utilizes ordinary least squares regression, with 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the student level (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; 
Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). The first stage model is: 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where i indexes at the infraction level, 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑖 is the total number of days of 
punishment, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a vector of infraction categories, which can be defined two ways (using all 
17 categories, or our 7 infraction types, grouped generally by severity), 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a vector of 
indicators for whether the infraction was the first, second, third, etc., for that student that year (a 
total of 10 indicators for 1-9 and 10 or more), 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 is a vector of school-year indicators, 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 is a vector of grade-level indicators, and 𝜀𝑖 is the infraction-level idiosyncratic error 
(clustered at the student level). In our primary model, we focus on days of exclusionary discipline 
(expulsion, OSS, or referral to an ALE) associated with a given infraction, with all other 
consequence types coded as zero days4. 
These residuals generated by the OLS model are then averaged at a school-by-year level to 
produce a measure of whether a school, on average, meted out longer punishments (residuals greater 
than 0) or shorter punishments (residuals less than 0), relative to the state average, for a similar type 
of infraction for a student in the same grade with a similar number of past disciplinary infractions. 
We refer to this average school-level residual as the School Severity Index (SSI). The school-by-year 
SSI values are estimated using a school-level random effects model, which shrinks the estimates 
towards zero for schools with relatively few observations. Schools with positive SSI values tend to 
give out longer punishments, and schools with negative SSI values tend to give out shorter 
punishments, relative to the state average for similar infraction observations. 
In the second stage, we predict the SSI as a function of school-level demographic 
characteristics to assess which school characteristics are associated with disciplinary practices: 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 
Where s indexes at the school level, 𝑋𝑠 is a vector of school level characteristics (log of 
enrollment, an indicator for region, an indicator for open-enrollment charter schools, indicators for 
elementary, middle, high school, or other school grade-level types, and the percentage of the student 
4 Days of exclusion were at most 365 days. The average expulsion was 18.4 days, the average OSS was 3.3 
days, and the average ALE was 10.6 days.  
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population that is FRL-eligible, of a certain race, receiving special education services, limited English 
proficient (LEP), or gifted and talented), 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is a vector of school-year indicators, and 𝜀𝑠 is the 
school-level idiosyncratic error. 
Next, we present our findings, beginning with some brief descriptive statistics and ultimately 
walking through the results of each of three research questions. 
Results 
Initial descriptive analyses focused on the frequency of both consequence types and 
infractions for different subgroups of students. In Figure 1, it is easy to see that non-White students 
are disproportionately receiving all types of consequences. On average, each year, there are 29.6 in-
school suspensions for every 100 Black students, but only 9.9 in-school suspensions for every 100 
White students. Each year, there are 24.6 out-of-school suspensions for every 100 Black students, 
but only 4.3 for every 100 White students. Thus, a ratio-based measure of the Black-White disparity 
in ISS indicates that Black students are about three times as likely to receive OSS as White students 
(29.6 divided by 9.9). For other consequence types such as referrals to ALE, this ratio is about 9.5 
times, or for OSS, 5.7 times. 
Figure 1. Disciplinary Consequences by Racial Subgroup (Annual Incidences per 100 Students, 2008-
09 to 2014-15) 
Looking just at the disparities in Figures 1, one might come to the quick conclusion that 
students are being treated unfairly, but it is also important to connect consequences to the 
infractions for which the students were referred. Thus, we next consider whether there are disparate 
rates of referrals for certain types of infractions, and indeed, we see that there are 
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disproportionalities at this level. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that disparities may 
still exist within each infraction type, which we address with Research Questions 1 and 2. 
First, a key take-away point from Figure 2 is that the vast majority (almost 80%) of 
incidences are minor, non-violent offenses (disorderly conduct, insubordination, and other). A 
second point is that Black students are three times more likely than White students to be referred for 
misbehavior but are nearly six times more likely to be given out-of-school suspensions (24.6 versus 
4.3 incidences per 100 students, in Figure 1). These data do indicate that Black students are being 
referred for discipline more often, but this only accounts for about half the difference in the rate of 
out-of-school suspensions. Our analyses in the next section, using logistic regression to examine 
incident-level data, helps us to identify more clearly whether there are disparities that still exist 
conditional on students’ reported behavior. 
Figure 2. Referrals by Infraction Type and Race (Annual Incidences per 100 Students, 2008-09 to 
2014-15) 
Research Question 1: Across the state, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use 
of exclusionary discipline for non-White students? 
Logistic regression is used to determine the disparities in the likelihood of exclusionary 
discipline, controlling for the type of infraction committed, the infraction history of the student, and 
the student’s grade level. No school-level factors are taken into account, so this model indicates the 
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extent to which different subgroups of students across the state are disproportionately exposed to 
exclusionary practices. Any differences by subgroup we find at this level could be due to differences 
at a variety of levels (across districts or schools, within district, or within school). 
Table 5 
Logistic Regression of Exclusionary Discipline (Arkansas State, 2008-09 to 2014-15) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Black 2.215*** 2.132*** 2.471*** 2.378*** 
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0238) (0.0233) 
Hispanic 0.795*** 0.838*** 0.888*** 0.897*** 
(0.0159) (0.0217) (0.0173) (0.0231) 
Other Minority 0.854*** 0.878*** 0.912** 0.920** 
(0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0345) (0.0356) 
FRL-Eligible 
 
1.475*** 1.224*** 
 
1.518*** 1.232*** 
(0.0135) (0.0115) (0.0145) (0.0120) 
Special Education 
 
1.106*** 1.068*** 1.090*** 
(0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0129) 
LEP 0.860*** 0.534*** 0.922** 
(0.0292) (0.0134) (0.0307) 
Grade Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
School Year 
Indicators 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Infraction Types Y Y Y Y Y 
Infraction Order 
Indicators 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.351*** 0.363*** 0.297*** 0.226*** 0.240*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.191*** 
(0.0720) (0.0732) (0.0611) (0.0498) (0.0526) (0.0752) (0.0753) (0.0423) 
Wald Chi-Squared    11,571      5,645    12,146    76,215    73,372      2,321    71,778    76,398 
Pseudo R-Squared      0.036      0.012      0.037      0.118      0.092      0.089      0.091      0.119 
Note: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the student level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. In all models, number of observations = 1,243,555, number of students = 240,999. Infraction types are 
indicators for different groups of infractions: guns, drugs and alcohol, truancy, major violence/weapons, minor 
violence/weapons, and major non-violent. Baseline infraction category is Minor Non-Violent Infractions. 
Relative risk ratios from several logistic regressions are indicated in Table 5. It is important 
to note that all models in Table 5, using infraction-level disciplinary data, are conditional on a 
student being referred for some infraction, so even without controlling for infraction, we can see 
that, holding constant that a student was referred for any misbehavior, we get a better picture of 
disciplinary disparities than with just comparing raw numbers of suspensions and expulsions as in 
Figures 1 and 2. In columns 1-3 of Table 5, we present the results of relatively naïve models that are 
contingent only upon the student being referred for some disciplinary infraction, but without 
accounting for infraction type. The primary results, based on models in which we control for the 
type of infraction committed and for the number of infractions committed by the student during the 
school year, are presented in columns 4-8.  
If disciplinary consequences were handed out evenly across various subgroups of students, 
we would expect to see relative risk ratios for each indicator (e.g. Black) equal to one. The results in 
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Table 5, column 4 indicate that Black students are almost 2.5 times as likely to receive exclusionary 
discipline as their White peers in the same grade for similar types of infractions, with a similar 
number of previous infractions that year. Hispanic students as well as other non-White students are 
somewhat less likely than their White peers to receive exclusionary discipline. In fact, these figures 
may represent a lower bound of the actual racial disparities in punishments, as they focus only on 
the instances of students being assigned to exclusionary discipline, but ignore possibly larger 
disparities in the number of days punished per suspension.  
Looking at columns 5, 6, and 7 of Table 5, instead of testing disproportionalities in 
exclusionary discipline using race indicators, we use other indicators of a student’s disadvantaged 
status (FRL-eligibility, Special Education status, or English proficiency). FRL-elgible students are 
about 1.5 times as likely as their non FRL-eligible peers in the state to receive exclusionary discipline. 
Special education students are slightly more likely to receive exclusionary discipline, and students 
with Limited English Proficiency are about half as likely to receive exclusionary discipline. The 
model in Column 8 includes the full combination of control variables. 
It is interesting that the racial disparities, indicated by the relative risk ratios on Black, 
Hispanic, and other non-White groups, are quite similar between columns 1 and 4 and columns 3 
and 8. The disparities based on FRL-status, indicated by the relative risk ratios on FRL-Eligible are 
also similar between columns 2 and 5. This result indicates that that the racial disparities in the use 
of exclusionary discipline are not driven solely by the types of infractions students committed. While 
the specific type of infraction, controlled for in columns 4-8, does help to explain whether a student 
receives exclusionary disipline (higher pseudo R-squared), the relative risk ratios for various racial 
subgroups do not decline much with the inclusion of infraction-type controls. The stability of these 
results gives us some confidence in our key finding, that Black students are more than twice as likely 
to receive exclusionary discipline after being referred for identical infractions. While the pseudo R-
squared values are somewhat low, they are not equivalent to the R-squared found in OLS regression, 
so while higher values represent better model fit, they cannot be interpreted exactly the same as the 
R-squared found in OLS regression (Institute for Digital Research and Education, 2017).5
The results for research question 1, discussed previously, are only representative of 
disparities in disciplinary outcomes across the state. It could be that most of these disparities only 
occur across schools, or it could be, instead, that disparities also exist within schools. In the next 
section, we utilize school fixed effects to assess what disproportionalties exist, if any, in disciplinary 
outcomes for students within the same schools. 
Research Question 2: Within schools, what, if any, disproportionalities exist in the use of 
exclusionary discipline for non-White students, low-income students, special education 
students, or English language learners? 
In this section, logistic regression is again used to assess whether student demographic 
factors are associated with higher rates of exclusionary discipline, this time for students within the 
same schools. Relative risk ratios from several logistic regressions, all including school fixed effects, 
are indicated in Table 6. The results in column 1 indicate that Black students are only slighly more 
likely to receive exclusionary discipline, relative to their White peers within the same schools. Larger 
disparirities can be seen based on whether the student is FRL-eligible (column 2) or receiving Special 
Education services (column 3). This result indicates, perhaps, the multiple tiers of privilege or 
disadvantage – that Black students are disproportionately exposed to exclusionary discipline as a 
5 Stata’s default pseudo R-squared value is McFadden’s R-squared, which is equivalent to 1 minus the ratio of 
the log likelihood of the full model to the log likelihood of a simple intercept model (Institution for Digital 
Research and Education, 2011). 
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function of the school that they attend, but that within schools, other factors such as poverty or 
special education status influence the likelihood of a student receiving exclusionary consequences. 
Table 6 
Logistic Regression of Exclusionary Discipline within Schools (Arkansas, 2008-09 to 2014-15) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Black 1.035*** 1.007 
(0.0109) (0.0108) 
Hispanic 0.935*** 0.949** 
(0.0156) (0.0205) 
Other Minority 1.011 1.023 
(0.0325) (0.0332) 
FRL-Eligibile 1.165*** 1.157*** 
(0.0104) (0.0105) 
Special Education 1.191*** 1.180*** 
(0.0115) (0.0115) 
Limited English Proficient 0.910*** 0.935*** 
(0.0180) (0.0243) 
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y 
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y 
Infraction Types Y Y Y Y Y 
Infraction Order Indicators Y Y Y Y Y 
School Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.0812*** 0.0706*** 0.0818*** 0.0820*** 0.0703*** 
(0.0234) (0.0205) (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0205) 
Observations  1,236,401  1,236,401  1,236,401  1,236,401  1,236,401 
Number of Students      239,202      239,202      239,202      239,202      239,202 
Model Chi-Squared      132,531      132,473      131,941      132,507      132,333 
Pseudo R2          0.324          0.325          0.325          0.324          0.325 
Note: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the student level; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Infraction types are indicators for different groups of infractions: guns, drugs and alcohol, truancy, major 
violence/weapons, minor violence/weapons, and major non-violent. Baseline infraction category is Minor Non-Violent 
Infractions. 
The coefficients on the indicator for Black students is smaller in the school fixed effects 
models (indeed, in the most full model, the odds ratio is not statistically different from one), relative 
to the models without school fixed effects, indicating that the racial disparities in exclusionary 
discipline are driven almost entirely by differences across schools rather than within schools. 
Because these analyses revealed that the between school differences are so important, in the 
following section, we test which characteristics of schools drive these differences. 
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Research Question 3: What are the school characteristics that are associated with 
harsher (longer) disciplinary consequences? 
Since there are larger racial disparities across the state than specifically within schools, it 
could be that there are differences in the disciplinary policies and practices at the types of schools 
that serve large proportions of non-White students. We test this by creating a School Severity Index 
(SSI) for each school using the residuals from an infraction-level model predicting the length of 
exclusionary punishments of various types. In this model, consequences other than exclusionary 
discipline (e.g. in-school suspension, corporal punishment, no action, or other actions) are coded as 
zero days of punishment, but are not removed from the model. The residuals are averaged at a 
school level to generate the school SSI: a positive SSI indicates that a school tends to give out longer 
(more exclusionary) punishments for similar types of infractions. A negative SSI indicates shorter 
(less exclusionary) punishments. These SSIs were created using school random effects to account for 
the noisy measures within schools with fewer disciplinary incidences by allocating greater weight to 
the schools with larger sample sizes and more precise measures. 
The SSI for each school are then regressed on a variety of school-level characteristics. The 
results in Table 7 are based on SSIs created in the first-stage using the days of exclusionary 
punishment. Other types of consequences are included as zero days. Importantly, the R-squared 
values in the models with the race percentage variables (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6) have about 2.5 times 
the predictive power of those without the race percentage variables (columns 1 and 4). Therefore, 
the racial breakdown of schools appears to be an important factor in explaining disciplinary 
outcomes within schools. The results here are stable across models and consistent with our earlier 
findings: Schools serving greater proportions of Black students had higher scores in the severity 
index and thus longer punishments; schools serving greater percentages of Hispanic students had 
lower scores.  
Other variables in Table 7 also appear to have significant relationships to the severity of 
punishment. Open-enrollment charter schools, all else equal, appear to give out somewhat harsher 
punishments (an extra 0.4 to 1.3 days of punishment, per infraction, depending on the model). 
Importantly, the charter school coefficient is much lower in the models including controls for the 
school racial demographics than in the models without these variables. Open-enrollment charter 
schools in the state are primarily clustered in urban areas and serve a larger proportion of Black 
students (41%) than the state average (21%), and fewer White students (46%, relative to 63%), so 
without controlling for these racial demographics, the charter school variable is confounded with 
racial demographics as well. It is possible that charter schools, conditional on student demographics, 
may use harsher punishments, if, for example, they focus on a so-called “no excuses” model as in 
the highly successful KIPP Charter Network (Arkansas had two locations in 2014-15, the last year in 
our dataset). In addition, evidence from Michigan indicates that students may seek out charter 
schools if they are already having disciplinary issues or other problems in the traditional public 
school district (Horn & Miron, 2000). 
The coefficients on middle school and high school may be surprising. Based on these 
coefficients alone, middle schools and high schools appear to be administering relatively less severe 
consequences than elementary schools in the state, for the same types of infractions. While these 
coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitude is somewhat small (about 0.1 days, per 
infraction). To interpret this relationship, it is also important to note that the SSI is the average 
residual from a model predicting the severity (number of days) of a punishment, as a function of a 
variety of things, including grade level. Therefore, the SSI, in some ways, is already accounting for 
the increasing severity by grade-level, so we just treat these school-type variables as control variables. 
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Table 7 
School Characteristics Associated with Harsher Punishments (Dep Var = School Severity Index based on days of 
exclusionary discipline, units= number of days) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (School Enrollment) 0.144*** -0.0202 -0.079*** 0.144*** -0.0209 -0.073***
(0.0192) (0.0166) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0166) (0.0187)
Sch. % Black 1.392*** 1.586*** 1.377*** 1.552***
(0.0355) (0.0449) (0.0355) (0.0450)
Sch. % Hispanic -0.800*** -0.658** -0.887*** -0.761***
(0.266) (0.265) (0.266) (0.266)
Sch. % Other Minority 1.716*** 1.444*** 1.762*** 1.518***
(0.274) (0.275) (0.274) (0.276) 
Sch. % FRL 1.106*** -0.554*** 1.118*** -0.499***
(0.0642) (0.0775) (0.0641) (0.0777)
Sch. % Gifted & Talented 2.934*** 2.093*** 1.908*** 2.925*** 2.083*** 1.919***
(0.185) (0.170) (0.172) (0.185) (0.170) (0.173) 
Sch. % Special Education -0.144 -0.112 -0.0269 -0.178 -0.143 -0.0636
(0.168) (0.155) (0.154) (0.168) (0.155) (0.155)
Sch. % LEP 0.410*** 1.901*** 2.116*** 0.433*** 2.012*** 2.207*** 
(0.117) (0.308) (0.308) (0.116) (0.308) (0.309) 
Open-Enrollment Charter 1.294*** 0.541*** 0.389*** 1.292*** 0.542*** 0.408*** 
(0.0884) (0.0825) (0.0859) (0.0883) (0.0826) (0.0860) 
Middle School -0.148*** -0.085*** -0.098*** -0.145*** -0.082*** -0.094***
(0.0306) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0306) (0.0283) (0.0283)
High School -0.115*** -0.0567** -0.080*** -0.115*** -0.0578** -0.079***
(0.0272) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0271) (0.0250) (0.0251)
Other School Type 0.680*** 0.487*** 0.431*** 0.690*** 0.500*** 0.449***
(0.0980) (0.0905) (0.0903) (0.0978) (0.0906) (0.0905)
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -1.771*** -0.446*** 0.195 -1.777*** -0.434*** 0.141 
(0.140) (0.106) (0.141) (0.140) (0.106) (0.141) 
Observations 6,871 6,891 6,871 6,871 6,891 6,871 
R-squared 0.096 0.236 0.241 0.098 0.233 0.238 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-3 use SSI created with all 17 infraction 
categories in the first stage. Models 4-6 use SSI created with the 7 infraction groups in the first stage. In the first stage, 
SSI were created using school random effects. Baseline school type is Elementary. 
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Overall, models 1, 2, and 3 are very similar to models 4, 5, and 6, respectively; the only 
difference is the number of infraction categories used to generate the SSI. The fullest models are 
presented in columns 3 and 6. In addition to the results related to the racial composition of the 
schools, there are few other interesting relationships. For example, schools serving greater numbers 
of Gifted and Talented students and Limited English Proficient students, also appear to give out 
somewhat harsher punishments. After racial characteristics are controlled for, the coefficient on the 
Free and Reduced lunch variable is actually negative – schools serving more students in poverty are 
less harsh in doling out consequences. The phenomenon here appears to be that the racial 
characteristics, which are correlated with the poverty rates, are driving the school-level differences in 
disciplinary outcomes. In fact, this seems consistent with our overall finding that Black students 
across the state face more severe disciplinary responses than do their peers. We will delve deeper 
into this finding in the section that follows on robustness checks. 
Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, we also ran models excluding the log of school enrollment. We do 
not present the tables summarizing these results here, but in all cases, in the models without school 
size accounted for, the disparities are similar but slightly higher.6 In addition, we also conducted 
robustness checks using days of any type of punishment (not just exclusionary). The results for the 
primary variable of interest (School percent Black) are generally similar. There are some differences, 
however, in terms of the coefficients on the School percent Hispanic, which has a significantly 
negative relationship with SSI when created using only exclusionary discipline, but a non-significant 
relationship in terms of days of any type of consequence. This indicates that, all else equal, while 
there is no relationship between the proportion of Hispanic students and the length of any type of 
disciplinary consequence, it is the case that schools with a greater proportion of Hispanic students 
generally give out shorter exclusionary type punishments.  
There is a surprising result from the models that include a measure of the percent of 
students who are FRL-eligible as well as percent Black (columns 3 and 6 in Table 7). The 
coefficients on the school percent FRL in this model are negative, despite the fact that the 
coefficients on FRL are positive in the models that do not control for percent Black (columns 1 and 
4 in Table 7). This is likely due to significant correlation between the percentage of students who are 
FRL-eligible in each school and the percentage of students who are Black in each school (r=0.499).  
To further understand what is happening within schools in terms of both White/non-White 
breakdown and the general income level of the students served, we created indicators for four types 
of schools (Low-Income Mostly White, Low-Income Mostly non-White, Higher-Income Mostly 
White, and Higher-Income Mostly non-White). These four categories are based on whether a school 
is above or below the state average on two separate indicators (percent White and percent FRL). 
The state averages during the study period were about 65% White and about 60% FRL. The uneven 
distribution of observations across these groups, as in Table 8, reflects the relative presence of these 
types of schools in the state, in the sense that there are relatively few schools that are mostly-non-
White and higher-income (8%), relative to the other three types. 
6 Tables are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 8 
Distribution of Four School Types 
Higher-Income Low-Income 
<60% FRL ≥60%FRL 
Mostly-Non-White <65% White 585 School Year 
Combinations  (8%) 
2,185 School-Year 
Combinations  (32%) 
Mostly-White ≥65% White 2,237 School-Year 
Combinations  (32%) 
1,886 School-Year 
Combinations  (27%) 
According to the results in Table 9, it seems that the schools with more non-White students 
(regardless of whether those schools tend to be higher income or lower income), tend to administer 
harsher (longer) punishments than the baseline schools serving more white students and higher-
income students. The first set of coefficients of interest indicates that schools serving more non-
white students, who are also higher income, still receive an additional half a day (roughly) of 
exclusionary discipline, per infraction, relative to their peers in schools serving more white students. 
Similarly, the third set of coefficients of interest indicates that students in these relatively poor, 
relatively non-White schools, receive about 0.6 days of extra punishment, relative to students in the 
relatively wealthy, relatively white schools. Therefore, these two findings indicate that schools with 
more non-White students tend to give out longer punishments, regardless of the percentage of 
students receiving FRL in a school. 
One of the most interesting results, however, is that there were no statistically significant 
differences between the length of punishments in wealthier and less wealthy schools, conditional on 
serving ≥65% white students. This suggests that racial factors appear more important than income 
factors for predicting the severity of disciplinary consequences. This seems consistent with our 
earlier models (Table 7); the magnitude and sign on the race variable is mostly unchanged by the 
inclusion of the poverty variable in the model. On the other hand, the poverty result is very sensitive 
to the inclusion of the race variable. In Table 9, open-enrollment charter schools still appear to use 
more severe consequences (about an extra 0.6 to 0.8 days of punishment, per infraction). 
As an additional robustness check, we also created the SSI using days of any kind of 
punishment, rather than only the days of exclusionary discipline. The coefficients for each of the 
four school types in this additional model are nearly identical to the coefficients from the primary 
model reported in Table 9.       
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Table 9 
School Characteristics Associated with Harsher Punishments (Dep Var = School Severity Index based on days of 
exclusionary discipline, units= number of days) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (School Enrollment) 0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.000 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Schools serving <60%FRL, <65% White 0.479*** 0.544*** 0.471*** 0.537*** 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Schools serving ≥60%FRL, ≥65% White 0.033 0.009 0.042 0.019 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Schools serving ≥60%FRL, <65% White 0.624*** 0.611*** 0.619*** 0.609*** 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
School % Gifted and Talented 2.235*** 2.235*** 
(0.182) (0.182) 
School % Special Education -0.270 -0.301*
(0.165) (0.165)
School % LEP -0.0615 -0.0184
(0.116) (0.116)
Open-Enrollment Charter School 0.782*** 0.599*** 0.785*** 0.604*** 
(0.088) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085) 
Middle School -0.125*** 0.015 -0.122*** 0.0170 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
High School -0.111*** 0.0128 -0.112*** 0.0110 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) 
Other School Type 0.563*** 0.526*** 0.575*** 0.534*** 
(0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) 
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.396*** -0.25288 -0.404*** -0.274**
(0.123) (0.113) (0.123) (0.113)
Observations 6,891 6,892 6,891 6,892 
R-squared 0.142 0.122 0.140 0.120 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1 and 2 use SSI created with all 17 
infraction categories in the first stage. Models 3 and 4 use SSI created with the 7 infraction groups in the first stage. In 
the first stage, SSI were created using school random effects. Baseline school type is Elementary. Baseline school type is 
more White and more non-FRL (<60% FRL, ≥65% White). 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
There have been numerous studies over the past twenty years documenting the existence of 
racial disparities in disciplinary consequences. From this research base, we know, with some 
confidence based on multiple studies across many years, that Black students are both referred for 
discipline more often and receive exclusionary disciplinary far more often than other students (e.g. 
Skiba et al., 2002). Moreover, some more recent studies have suggested that Black students receive 
more severe and longer consequences than their peers, who have committed identical infractions 
(e.g. Skiba et al., 2002). Finally, based on a single recent study in a single state for a single year (Skiba 
et al., 2014), along with inferences we can draw from a 1998 survey and consequence-data from 
Chicago (Sartain et al., 2015), we believe these disparities are more likely driven by differences 
between schools than by differential treatment of students within a given school.  
In this study, we aimed to build on this growing research base by analyzing all infraction-
level disciplinary data for every public school in Arkansas over a seven year time span. Consistent 
with earlier evidence, we found disproportionate use of exclusionary discipline for Black students, 
and we also found that these disparities are primarily due to differences in discipline practices across 
schools, rather than within schools. This result supports the important work of Skiba et al. (2014), 
and builds upon that work by providing analysis of an entire state over seven school years, rather 
than just one school year. 
When school fixed effects are not included, Black students are about 2.4 times as likely as 
their White peers in the state (in the same grade and with similar numbers of previous infractions) to 
receive exclusionary discipline for similar infraction types. Hispanic students are slightly less likely 
than their similar White peers in the state to receive exclusionary discipline. Importantly, the 
disparities are not only based on race. Depending on whether or not race was also controlled for, 
our results indicate that FRL students in the state are about 1.2 to 1.5 times as likely to receive 
exclusionary discipline as their non-FRL peers. 
However, we conclude that most of the racial differences in rates of exclusionary discipline 
are across schools, because these racial disparities diminished greatly when school fixed effects were 
included. Within schools, Black students are only slightly more likely than White students to receive 
exclusionary discipline (relative risk ratio of 1.04, significant at the 99% confidence level). 
Interestingly, within schools, there still appear to be persistent gaps in the use of exclusionary 
discipline for FRL students and special education students (relative risk ratios of about 1.2). The 
implications of this for state or district-level policy are not exactly clear. 
These results indicate that the large racial disparities tend to be across schools, and therefore 
a function of the types of schools that non-White students are likely to attend, whereas within 
schools, there may be larger concerns about disparities based on socio-economic status and special 
education status. Since the results indicate that the state-level racial disparities are likely a function of 
the school attended, we also tested which school level factors were associated with a measure of 
school disciplinary severity (SSI), and found that the percent of the school that is Black or the 
percent of the school that is of another non-White, non-Black, non-Hispanic group are both 
significant predictors of harsher (longer) consequences, which supports the idea that most of the 
racial disparities occur due to different disciplinary practices being used in districts/schools serving 
different racial compositions of students.  
When schools were split into four categories based on the proportions of FRL students and 
White students in the school, we found that schools serving more non-White students (regardless of 
the proportion of FRL students) administered longer punishments than schools serving mostly 
White, non-FRL students. However, lower income, mostly White schools were actually quite similar 
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to the higher-income, mostly White schools, again indicating that differences in exclusionary 
practices across schools appear to be more driven by racial demographics than by income or 
poverty.  
Overall, then, there seem to be two broad conclusions from this work. First, non-White 
students are far more likely to receive exclusionary discipline for a given infraction than are their 
White peers, and this disparity is driven by disciplinary practices employed at the schools non-White 
students attend. Second, the differences by race are far more impactful than the differences due to 
poverty. So, what are the implications for policy?  
Based on the analyses presented here, and on our interactions with state level policymakers, 
we believe there are two broad lessons for policymakers and school leaders, the first related to data 
transparency and the second to targeted reforms.  
First, we have uncovered patterns in disciplinary consequences that were previously not well 
known in the local education community. Thus, we believe that a critical first step in creating 
positive change with regard to student discipline is broadly sharing discipline data with education 
stakeholders including staff, administration, families, and communities. For example, school leaders 
and state policymakers would benefit from reports that allow for comparisons of disciplinary 
practices and statistics across schools. Given that the diaparities are primarily across schools and not 
within, school leaders may not be aware of a problem until they are able to compare their school to 
others in the state. When awareness of potential disparities in discipline is raised, school leaders may 
seek out more concrete programs or strategies to address such issues. It is possible that simply 
sharing data on school-level rates of exclusion may create awareness that serves as a catalyst for 
action within communities as well. Moreover, as Tatto et al. (2001) have shown, parental perceptions 
of unequal or overly strict disciplinary practices can undermine school culture. When policymakers 
and/or school leaders actively share discipline data, parents can be empowered to advocate for their 
children and work with school leaders to devise solutions. 
Second, the primary conclusion policymakers should draw from our analyses is that the 
clearest evidence of racial disparities in discipline occur across schools. That is, schools serving 
predominantly Black students impose more severe (longer) exclusionary consequences on students, 
even after controlling for the type of infraction. Thus, to address these disparities statewide, 
policymakers can focus on these particular schools which serve mostly Black students and are 
engaging in particularly severe disciplinary practices. 
One strategy that policymakers might adopt would be mandates to reduce suspensions – at 
least for minor nonviolent infractions – in targeted schools. This sort of change could be impactful 
as nearly half (49%) of the infractions that lead to exclusionary discipline are minor, non-violent, and 
perhaps subjective. These infractions include disorderly conduct (~26%), insubordination (~20%), 
and truancy (~3%). It surely seems possible to address such (mostly minor) infractions with 
preventative or restorative alternatives to exclusionary discipline. For example, there is some 
evidence that simply revising codes of conduct (or setting policies) to reduce the use of suspensions 
for minor offenses and limit the length of suspensions may be effective (Lacoe & Steinberg, 2016; 
Mader et al., 2016) and at little cost to school climate (Mader et al., 2016).  
Further, there are school-based interventions, some of which have been rigorously evaluated, 
designed to improve school climate and disciplinary outcomes. For example, there are non-
experimental studies that find reductions in referrals or suspensions and expulsions with programs 
such as Response to Intervention (RTI), which attempts to prevent recidivism by responding to 
behavioral issues as they arise (Fairbanks et al., 2007). Another strategy, commonly known as 
restorative justice, is viewed as a movement to “institutionalize peaceful and non-punitive 
approaches for addressing harm” that in a school setting can serve as an alternative to exclusionary 
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discipline (Fronius et al., 2016). Essentially, restorative justice is a non-punitive approach to handling 
conflicts, but these programs can take the form of whole-school interventions or as an “add-on” to 
respond to specific situations (Fronius et al., 2016). Finally, School-Wide Positive Behavioral 
Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS a.k.a. PBIS) may be the most well-known behavioral 
intervention and, fortunately, has been subject to some rigorous evaluation. Indeed, there is some 
experimental evidence that indicates implementation of the PBIS framework decreases office 
referrals (Flannery et al., 2014) and improves student perceptions of school safety and test scores 
(Horner et al., 2009). As of June 2016, there are currently 49 known schools implementing PBIS in 
Arkansas (Saarnio & Merten, 2016). 
While mandated reductions in exclusionary discipline may be appealing and are certainly 
simple, we have two reservations about this approach. First, it is possible that school leaders may 
respond to mandates superficially, by changing reporting patterns without substantially improving 
their disciplinary practices. Second, mandated reductions without any other supports are unlikely to 
be effective. Front line educators in the schools will need some alternative to exclusionary discipline 
if such mandates are put in place; the school culture is unlikely to improve if educators do not have 
the necessary capacity to respond to behavioral infractions. Thus, if state policymakers are to 
mandate reductions, they should also consider providing schools with access to some of the more 
positive alternative disciplinary strategies described above.  
While we advocate for data transparency, we understand that there are limitations to the 
conclusions that should be drawn and there is a real potential for unintended consequences. First of 
all, it is not obvious that high numbers of disciplinary refererals and consequences are bad – or 
good. For example, a school with very few reported infractions may either be one with a great 
school climate, or one where adminstrators fail to address real problems related to student discipline. 
Thus, school context matters. Finally, even without a policy mandate aimed at reduction, the greater 
public attention paid to disciplinary data may have the unitended effect of encouraging school 
personnel to simply under-report or code disciplinary infractions and consequences in vague 
categories (such as “other”).  
To be clear, we are not suggesting that policymakers ignore disciplinary data, but that these 
numbers be interpreted with appropriate caution and in context. In fact, while the discussion of 
disciplinary disparities has been ongoing for several decades, the practice of public reporting of 
school level discipline data is relatively new. Thus, while policymakers should certainly pay attention 
to these data, we would argue that it is premature to attach high-stakes consequences to disciplinary 
outcomes. 
Ultimately, while the results presented here do not provide step-by-step solutions, they do 
provide further confidence in the early findings from the research literature that Black students face 
disciplinary disparities, even for relatively minor infractions. We have also provided some 
information about which schools in Arkansas are more likely to impose relatively severe 
consequences that remove students from classrooms. The first step in addressing a potential 
problem is identifying it. It is our hope that policymakers and researchers and school leaders 
collaborate on the next step: to implement potentially effective strategies and rigorously evaluate the 
results to improve the schooling experience for students in the future. 
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